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How has the private equity market evolved since the 1980s in terms of deal structure and valuation philosophy?

Answered in E426: American Securities CEO on Warren Buffett, Private Equity & Playing the Long Game · How I Invest with David Weisburd

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How has the private equity market evolved since the 1980s in terms of deal structure and valuation philosophy?

Early private equity investors in the 1980s diverged sharply from public company acquirers by analyzing deals through cash flow rather than earnings per share. While public firms obsessed over whether an acquisition would be accretive to EPS, leveraged buyout specialists spotted hidden value—particularly in companies with recent capital expenditures that generated depreciation charges, reducing reported earnings but not actual cash available for debt repayment.

The Accretion Trap vs. the Cash Flow Lens

When Michael joined Goldman Sachs' mergers and acquisitions group in 1983, the department had just 33 people and the M&A market barely existed. Most acquisitions by public companies hinged on a single financial metric: would this deal increase earnings per share or dilute it? If the acquisition diluted EPS, the analysis stopped—deal rejected or repriced lower.

The bootstrappers—early private equity practitioners—operated by a completely different calculus. Consider two chemical companies with identical revenues and net income. One had just built a brand-new plant using cash, generating depreciation charges that suppressed reported earnings. The competitor owned an aging plant with no recent depreciation, showing higher net income on the same operational reality. A public company buyer might price both identically, blind to the cash flow advantage embedded in the new plant. But a private equity investor saw something else: "I don't need to pay for a new plant for 5, 10, or 20 years—and that depreciation charge is actually cash in my pocket."

This was, as Michael describes it, a philosophical divide explained in depth in the episode —not merely a different formula, but an entirely different investment religion. The private equity lens ignored the P&L fiction of depreciation and focused on what actually moved: free cash flow available for debt service and returns.

From Boutique to Trillion-Dollar Industry

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In short

Early private equity investors in the 1980s diverged sharply from public company acquirers by analyzing deals through cash flow rather than earnings per share.

David Weisburd · E426: American Securities CEO on Warren Buffett, Private Equity & Playing the Long Game · How I Invest with David Weisburd

Key takeaways

  • When Michael joined Goldman Sachs' mergers and acquisitions group in 1983, the department had just 33 people and the M&A market barely existed.
  • The bootstrappers—early private equity practitioners—operated by a completely different calculus.
  • This was, as Michael describes it, a philosophical divide explained in depth in the episode —not merely a different formula, but an entirely different investment religion.

Quote to remember

“I don't need to pay for a new plant for 5, 10, or 20 years—and that depreciation charge is actually cash in my pocket.”

— David Weisburd

The full answer

Early private equity investors in the 1980s diverged sharply from public company acquirers by analyzing deals through cash flow rather than earnings per share. While public firms obsessed over whether an acquisition would be accretive to EPS, leveraged buyout specialists spotted hidden value—particularly in companies with recent capital expenditures that generated depreciation charges, reducing reported earnings but not actual cash available for debt repayment.

The Accretion Trap vs. the Cash Flow Lens

When Michael joined Goldman Sachs' mergers and acquisitions group in 1983, the department had just 33 people and the M&A market barely existed. Most acquisitions by public companies hinged on a single financial metric: would this deal increase earnings per share or dilute it? If the acquisition diluted EPS, the analysis stopped—deal rejected or repriced lower.

The bootstrappers—early private equity practitioners—operated by a completely different calculus. Consider two chemical companies with identical revenues and net income. One had just built a brand-new plant using cash, generating depreciation charges that suppressed reported earnings. The competitor owned an aging plant with no recent depreciation, showing higher net income on the same operational reality. A public company buyer might price both identically, blind to the cash flow advantage embedded in the new plant. But a private equity investor saw something else: "I don't need to pay for a new plant for 5, 10, or 20 years—and that depreciation charge is actually cash in my pocket."

This was, as Michael describes it, a philosophical divide explained in depth in the episode —not merely a different formula, but an entirely different investment religion. The private equity lens ignored the P&L fiction of depreciation and focused on what actually moved: free cash flow available for debt service and returns.

From Boutique to Trillion-Dollar Industry

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