How did the market size for cloud infrastructure prove wrong the 2014 narrative that AWS would consume all enterprise software opportunities?
Answered at 4:47 in Everyone Is Still Undersizing the AI Market | Eric Vishria · Invest Like The Best
How did the market size for cloud infrastructure prove wrong the 2014 narrative that AWS would consume all enterprise software opportunities?
By 2014, the prevailing narrative was that AWS would eat everything including databases, infrastructure, and applications due to its ability to offer services at 8% gross margin versus SaaS companies running at 85% gross margins. However, the market was so large that one vendor could not scale and consume it all. Instead, you saw Snowflake outperform Amazon Redshift, Datadog become a $100 billion company competing against AWS monitoring tools, plus Confluent, Elastic, Mongo, and Databricks all succeed. Additionally, Azure and GCP became unbelievable businesses, creating an oligopoly that now appears to be roughly 40-30-20 split, with smaller players like Cloudflare emerging as another $100 billion company.
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In short
By 2014, the prevailing narrative was that AWS would eat everything including databases, infrastructure, and applications due to its ability to offer services at 8% gross margin versus SaaS companies running at 85% gross margins.
Eric Vishria, Venture Partner at Sequoia Capital · Everyone Is Still Undersizing the AI Market | Eric Vishria · Invest Like The Best · answer at 4:47
Key takeaways
- By 2014, the prevailing narrative was that AWS would eat everything including databases, infrastructure, and applications due to its ability to offer services at 8% gross margin versus SaaS companies running at 85% gross margins.
Quote to remember
“Every single day that you are hitting your plan, you are destroying equity value. Every day you hit that plan, you're fucking up. You're destroying value.”
— Eric Vishria
The full answer · about 2 min
By 2014, the prevailing narrative was that AWS would eat everything including databases, infrastructure, and applications due to its ability to offer services at 8% gross margin versus SaaS companies running at 85% gross margins. However, the market was so large that one vendor could not scale and consume it all. Instead, you saw Snowflake outperform Amazon Redshift, Datadog become a $100 billion company competing against AWS monitoring tools, plus Confluent, Elastic, Mongo, and Databricks all succeed. Additionally, Azure and GCP became unbelievable businesses, creating an oligopoly that now appears to be roughly 40-30-20 split, with smaller players like Cloudflare emerging as another $100 billion company.
Key facts
- Fireworks achieves 5x performance difference versus cloud providers on same models and hardware
- AWS S3 and EC2 launched in 2006
- Bezos discussed AWS importance in 2007 annual letter; investor reaction was poor
- In 2014, smart investors would have gone 0 for 30 correctly predicting AWS long-term margins
- Cloud computing roughly 40-30-20 split between AWS, Azure/GCP by 2026
People, companies and topics mentioned
More answers from this episode
- 1:19Why does Fireworks achieve 5x performance difference compared to cloud providers running the same open source models on identical NVIDIA hardware?
- 3:37What did AWS investor sentiment reveal about predicting long-term margin sustainability in infrastructure businesses in 2007?
- 7:10What does the comparison between cloud adoption timelines and current AI adoption reveal about enterprise readiness in 2025?
- 9:58How do product managers and engineers need to work differently in the AI era compared to traditional SaaS product development?