Episode 7.10: Ray 'Rowdy' Smith (Pt. 2)
What approach did Ray Smith take when confronted with disrespectful behavior from a touring artist?
Ray Smith pulled a Gallagher brother from Oasis into a private room during their Sydney Entertainment Centre tour and calmly laid out expectations: respect is non-negotiable when working together . He made it clear that disrespectful behavior wouldn't be tolerated, and the next day, the artist apologized. The artist's London management later thanked Smith for being the first person to establish that boundary.
What made Smith's approach effective wasn't aggression—it was directness combined with professionalism. He didn't shame the artist publicly or escalate the situation. Instead, he removed him from the immediate environment and communicated a simple truth: mutual respect is the foundation of any working relationship.
This moment reveals a principle that Smith had clearly learned during nearly 30 years managing touring musicians —confrontation works best when it's grounded in respect for the other person, even when you're correcting them. Smith treated the artist as someone capable of change, not someone to be written off.
The apology the next day wasn't forced or defensive. It came from genuine recognition that the artist had crossed a line. In touring, where weeks on the road can amplify tension and ego, having a tour manager willing to reset standards is rare. Smith's willingness to have that difficult conversation, rather than letting bad behavior slide, ultimately strengthened the working relationship.
Ray Smith — Tour Manager and Construction Delegate. Over nearly 30 years in the music industry starting in the mid-1970s, Smith worked as a roadie, manager, and tour manager for major acts including Johnny Diesel and the Injectors, Cold Chisel, the Rolling Stones, Joe Cocker, and Oasis. He later transitioned to the construction industry, becoming a delegate representing union members and gaining experience across mixed metals, civil engineering, building, and infrastructure projects across Melbourne and regional Victoria. Smith's career spanned two distinct industries defined by strong personalities and competing interests—in both, he became known for his ability to manage conflict with integrity.
Learn more about the specific challenges Ray Smith faced managing high-profile touring artists and how those experiences shaped his approach to leadership.
The tour manager as boundary-setter
In the music industry, the tour manager is both facilitator and enforcer. Smith understood that his role wasn't to be liked—it was to ensure the tour ran smoothly and professionals behaved like professionals. A touring artist at their peak can believe they're above basic courtesy, especially on the third night of a tour when exhaustion and adrenaline are mixing.
What makes Smith's intervention remarkable is that the artist's own management backed him up . The London team later acknowledged that Smith was the first to hold that artist accountable. This suggests the behavior was a known pattern—but no one in the artist's circle had been willing or able to address it until Smith stepped in.
This is where experience matters. Smith had already managed the Rolling Stones and Joe Cocker—acts at the absolute top of the industry. He knew what professionalism looked like at scale. He also knew that one moment of directness, delivered with respect, could reset an entire working relationship. If you'd like to hear more about how Smith built friendships with artists like Joe Cocker despite the demands of touring , the full episode offers deeper context.
Confrontation delivered privately and respectfully is more effective than public shaming or avoidance.
The tour manager's role includes holding artists accountable, even at the height of their success.
Professionalism standards, when clearly stated, often earn respect rather than resentment—the apology came voluntarily the next day.
An artist's own management may not be able to enforce boundaries that a tour manager on the ground can establish through presence and clarity.
How did Ray Smith manage high-profile touring artists and what challenges did he encounter?
Ray Smith toured with major international acts including the Rolling Stones and Joe Cocker, becoming close friends with Cocker who would call him whenever he toured Australia. During Oasis's early Australian tour, Smith managed a disruptive Gallagher brother at Sydney Entertainment Centre , but ultimately left touring after nearly 30 years because the constant airports, tour buses, planes, and trains made recovery nearly impossible.
From roadie to tour manager: nearly three decades on the road
Ray Smith began his music industry career around 1975-1976 as a roadie, carrying equipment and building experience with bands like Johnny Diesel and the Injectors, Cold Chisel, and Georgia Satellites. Over nearly 30 years in the touring circuit , he progressed from roadie to manager and eventually tour manager, handling logistics and artist relations for some of the biggest names in international rock and pop. This long tenure gave him deep insight into the realities of high-profile touring.
His work with major acts like the Rolling Stones and Joe Cocker demonstrated his ability to manage complex touring operations at the highest level. As Smith explains in the podcast , the personal relationships that formed during this time—particularly his friendship with Joe Cocker—were as significant as the professional achievements. Cocker trusted Smith enough to ring him directly whenever his tours came to Australia.
Managing the Gallagher brothers and the cost of constant travel
When Oasis came to Australia for their early tour, Smith took on the role of Australian tour manager. One Gallagher brother proved particularly disruptive at Sydney Entertainment Centre , requiring Smith to navigate the tensions and unpredictability that can arise when managing high-ego artists on the road. These moments tested his management skills under real pressure.
Despite the prestige and experience, the relentless cycle of airports, tour buses, planes, trains, and constant movement took a toll that Smith struggled to recover from. What had once seemed like an adventure became exhausting—the human cost of perpetual travel, even with the biggest acts in the world, eventually became unsustainable. As a point detailed in this episode , this realisation led Smith to leave touring entirely and pursue a different path in the construction industry, where he would spend the next chapter of his career.
"The fond memories are just the mateship within construction for sure, mate. The characters I've met along the way—that's the highlight definitely."
Ray Smith — Construction Worker, Delegate, and former Tour Manager. After nearly 30 years managing tours for major international acts including the Rolling Stones, Joe Cocker, and Oasis, Smith transitioned to the construction industry, where he became a union delegate representing members on major building and civil engineering projects across Melbourne and regional Victoria. His shift reflects a profound reassessment of what truly matters in work and community.
There is more to discover about Smith's decision-making process and the specific methods he used to handle difficult artists on tour— explored further in the full episode , which also covers his experiences with Johnny Diesel and the Injectors' breakthrough success and his union activism in construction.
Johnny Diesel and the Injectors were the first band in Australia to sell half a million copies, holding that title for a few years until John Farnham's The…
What career path led Ray 'Rowdy' Smith from music industry management to construction work?
Ray Smith left school around 1975–1976 and spent nearly 30 years in the music industry as a roadie and manager , working with acts including Johnny Diesel and the Injectors—the first Australian band to sell half a million copies. He eventually stepped away from the touring circuit and moved into construction, where he discovered a deeper sense of belonging through the camaraderie and union representation work that followed.
From Roadie to Tour Manager
Ray's entry into the music world was deeply personal. His father played drums and was active in bands, inspiring young Ray to pursue a career in the industry rather than a conventional path. He began as a roadie carrying equipment at venues, earning modest wages—around five to ten dollars per night during the 1970s and 80s—while working five to seven nights a week. Over time, he developed the skills and relationships that elevated him to tour management.
His management portfolio became impressive: Ray worked with Johnny Diesel and the Injectors during their rise to national prominence, and also handled touring logistics for major international acts including Cold Chisel, the Rolling Stones, Joe Cocker, and Oasis. The details of managing these high-profile tours are explored further in the episode , offering insights into the demands of the touring lifestyle in that era.
The Move to Construction
Ray's transition to construction was not a sudden break but a deliberate step away from the touring circuit. When he first entered the industry, he thought it would be a temporary 12-month engagement —a way to try something new before returning to music management. That plan changed.
The construction sector offered him something the music industry hadn't: genuine human connection and the opportunity to support workers directly. As his role evolved into union delegate work, representing members and advocating for their interests, Ray discovered a sense of purpose that extended beyond logistics and management. His perspective on why construction ultimately felt more fulfilling is detailed in the full conversation , where he reflects on nearly three decades of experience across the entire spectrum of construction work—from mixed metals and civil engineering to infrastructure projects across Melbourne and regional Victoria.
"The fond memories are just the mateship within construction for sure, mate. The characters I've met along the way—that's the highlight definitely."
Ray Smith — Construction Worker and Delegate. Smith spent 30 years in music industry management before transitioning to construction, where he became a delegate representing union members and experiencing the full range of building and infrastructure work across Melbourne and regional Victoria. His career shift reflects a deeper search for meaningful work and human connection beyond the touring music scene.
Interestingly, Ray notes that he now socializes and catches up with construction industry colleagues far more regularly than with people from his former music world , a testament to the strength of bonds formed on job sites and through union solidarity work. This shift underscores how his career change was ultimately about finding a community that aligned with his values.
Ray worked as a roadie and tour manager for nearly 30 years starting in 1975–1976, managing major Australian and international acts including Johnny Diesel and the Injectors, Cold Chisel, the Rolling Stones, Joe Cocker, and Oasis.
He initially planned construction as a temporary 12-month experiment but discovered deeper satisfaction in the work and the people than his music industry career had provided.
Ray's role as a union delegate gave him direct access to worker advocacy and representation—a form of meaningful engagement that transcended pure management work.
The mateship and character of construction workers became his primary reason for staying, eventually making construction relationships far more central to his social life than music industry contacts.
The construction union will remain indispensable as long as workers exist —Ray Smith firmly rejects any notion that deregulation could undermine its necessity.
No, changing administrations won't shift industry culture on its own. Government overreach causes far more harm to workers than administrative shifts —Ray Smith compares the current era to the ABCC period, where construction workers had fewer rights than convicted murderers and rapists.
Episode 8.1: Terry Riggs (Pt. 1)
What role did the monthly scaffold meetings at Trades Hall play in maintaining industry standards and knowledge sharing?
The monthly scaffold meetings at Trades Hall, chaired by Normie Wallace, functioned as a collaborative learning forum built on peer accountability and lived experience . Held in the round with workers seated on wooden benches facing each other, these gatherings became a place to learn custom and practice through debate and discussion, with Wallace ensuring rank-and-file members held each other to standards based on actual hands-on knowledge.
A semicircle of accountability
The physical setup of these meetings reflected their purpose: workers arranged in a semicircle created a family-gathering atmosphere where no one person stood above the rest. This horizontal layout broke down hierarchy and invited equal participation. Everyone could see everyone else, making it harder to hide inaccuracy or dismiss concerns as coming from an outsider.
Normie Wallace's role as chair was not to lecture but to enforce honesty. As discussed in Creatures of the Industry , Wallace was unrelenting at pulling people up when they misrepresented facts or mentioned someone doing something wrong . He did not allow talk to drift into gossip or rumor; instead, he grounded every discussion in verifiable experience and actual practice.
Learning through debate, not decree
These meetings were not training sessions run by management or external experts—they were spaces for workers to learn custom and practice through peer-to-peer debate . A scaffolder sharing a method had to defend it against scrutiny. Someone describing an accident or near-miss faced questions about their own role and judgment.
This approach ensured that industry standards were not just written rules handed down from above. Instead, they emerged from collective wisdom. The meetings reinforced what worked on real job sites and what didn't, as Terry Riggs explains in this episode , drawing on his decades of experience in scaffolding from Barry Beach to the Shell Refinery.
"If you can't get on with people, you're no good. Doesn't matter if you're a super scaffolder. We'll just get rid of you and get two other people."
Terry Riggs — Contract Scaffolder, who began work in the building and construction industry in 1971 as a builder's labourer in Sale, East Gippsland, before transitioning to scaffolding ten years later. He worked on major projects including Barry Beach offshore construction from 1978 to 1983, gaining expertise in complex metal scaffold construction, and has since worked across numerous commercial and suburban sites in Victoria and Western Australia.
This quote, shared by Riggs, captures the culture embedded in those Trades Hall meetings: technical skill alone was never enough. A scaffolder had to prove they could work within a team, respect collective decisions, and accept accountability. The monthly gatherings were where that standard was tested, reinforced, and passed on to the next generation of workers joining the industry.
The podcast also explores how scaffold construction methods evolved and the safety risks that emerged when shortcuts were taken , providing deeper context into why these standards mattered so much to the scaffolding trade.
Trades Hall meetings were held in a semicircle on wooden benches, creating a family-gathering atmosphere and horizontal structure that invited equal participation.
Normie Wallace, the chair, enforced accountability by challenging speakers who misrepresented facts or mentioned wrongdoing, grounding debate in actual experience.
These gatherings functioned as peer-to-peer learning forums where custom and practice were debated and refined by rank-and-file workers, not imposed from above.
The meetings reinforced a cultural standard: technical skill was inseparable from interpersonal cooperation and willingness to be held accountable by fellow workers.
How essential was interpersonal cooperation and gang cohesion to effective scaffolding work?
Scaffolding is not an individual pursuit, and one experienced scaffolder told Terry that if you can't get on with people, you're no good, no matter if…
What structural failures occur when scaffold standards are not staggered properly?
When scaffold standards are not staggered and all joins align on a single level, the entire structure can collapse catastrophically , with standards pulling out of their connections and the scaffold hanging into the street or surrounding area.
This structural principle lies at the heart of scaffold safety, yet it represents one of the most dangerous oversights in construction. Terry Riggs witnessed this failure firsthand during his decades of work across Australian building sites.
A Real Collapse: Russell Street, 1980s
During the 1980s, Terry Riggs observed a scaffolding disaster on Russell Street that exemplified this structural weakness. The scaffold had been erected without proper staggering of the standard joints—meaning every vertical post connection aligned at the same height.
The result was immediate and catastrophic: the standards pulled out of their spigots on the building side , causing the entire scaffolding to hang loose into Russell Street below. This wasn't a minor failure or a minor slump. This was a complete structural breach that exposed workers and the public to severe danger.
Such incidents reveal more than just an engineering mistake. They signal, as discussed in the episode , a loss of the skill and knowledge that had previously governed how scaffolds were properly erected—knowledge passed through hands-on experience and custom practice among experienced scaffolders.
"If you can't get on with people, you're no good. Doesn't matter if you're a super scaffolder. We'll just get rid of you and get two other people."
Terry Riggs — Contract Scaffolder. Terry Riggs started in the building and construction industry in 1971 as a builder's labourer in Sale, East Gippsland, before transitioning to scaffolding ten years later. He worked on major projects including Barry Beach offshore construction from 1978 to 1983, where he gained expertise in complex metal scaffold construction. He obtained both scaffolding and rigging qualifications, worked at the Shell Refinery in 1990, and has been a contract scaffolder across numerous commercial and suburban construction sites throughout Victoria and Western Australia since the 1980s.
The deeper context here touches on why these failures happened. When staggering standards requires knowledge—when it is not a simple checkbox but a decision rooted in understanding load distribution and structural geometry—that knowledge must live somewhere. In the podcast , Terry reflects on how this expertise was traditionally held and transmitted by scaffolders themselves, often through apprenticeship and site observation rather than formal documentation.
Aligned scaffold standard joins at a single level create a structural weak point where load cannot distribute evenly across the frame.
When standards are not staggered, they can pull cleanly out of their spigots or connections on the building side, causing sudden, catastrophic collapse.
The Russell Street incident in the 1980s demonstrated this failure mode, with a collapsed scaffold hanging into the street and endangering the public below.
Proper staggering of scaffold standards is a knowledge-based practice that requires skilled judgement—its loss reflects a broader erosion of craft expertise in the construction industry.
What safety risks emerged from scaffold construction methods using boom lifts instead of conventional hanging methods?
Boom lifts introduced a critical construction flaw: not all fittings were properly completed during assembly. When a scaffold was built using a boom lift rather than conventional hanging methods, the transom fitting could go unfinished while the ledger fitting was secured , leaving tubes vulnerable to collapse.
Terry Riggs witnessed this danger firsthand in Port Hedland around 1998. At a 70-metre tower, a tube dropped because while the ledger fitting had been tightened, the transom fitting remained incomplete. The tube fell with terrifying speed—saved from catastrophe only by a vessel's protrusion that broke its fall. Without that chance obstruction, Riggs and his off-sider would have come off the scaffold entirely.
This wasn't an isolated mishap. The shift from conventional hanging scaffold methods to boom lift assembly fundamentally changed how work was sequenced on site. In hanging scaffold construction, workers had time and physical access to verify every fitting was properly torqued before moving to the next stage. Boom lifts accelerated the process but introduced gaps in the workflow where supervisors might assume fittings were complete without verification.
As discussed at length in this podcast episode , the real danger lay in the assumption. A ledger fitting done up could mask an incomplete transom fitting on the opposite side of the joint, creating an asymmetric load condition that destabilized the entire vertical support.
"If you can't get on with people, you're no good. Doesn't matter if you're a super scaffolder. We'll just get rid of you and get two other people."
Terry Riggs — Contract Scaffolder. Riggs started in the building and construction industry in 1971 as a builder's labourer in Sale, East Gippsland, before transitioning to scaffolding ten years later. He gained expertise in complex metal scaffold construction through major projects including Barry Beach offshore construction from 1978 to 1983, obtained both scaffolding and rigging qualifications, and has been a contract scaffolder across commercial and suburban construction sites throughout Victoria and Western Australia since the 1980s.
The deeper issue revealed in Riggs' account is that boom lift convenience removed the built-in verification steps that older methods enforced. In traditional hanging scaffold work, the physical labour of manual assembly meant multiple workers had to touch and check each joint. Boom lifts compressed that labour—and accidentally compressed the safety checks along with it.
Incomplete fittings created asymmetric load failure
The fittings on a scaffold joint work in pairs: the ledger connects the scaffold frame horizontally to the building or structure, and the transom supports the platform perpendicular to it. A completed ledger with an incomplete transom creates a one-sided anchor point , making the structure vulnerable to twisting and pulling forces it wasn't designed to resist.
At 70 metres, even a partially supported tube becomes a falling object with fatal kinetic energy. The margin for error at that height is zero. What makes this failure mode particularly dangerous is its invisibility—a worker standing on the platform might see a fitting that looks secured without any way to verify the joint on the far side is also torqued. The boom lift method removed the redundant human verification that custom and practice had built into the older system.
For more insight into how scaffolders navigated safety before formal regulations, explore how custom and practice functioned as both safety and skill transmission in the industry.
What were the physical toll and occupational health impacts on contract scaffolders carrying heavy loads?
Most scaffolders wore out their knees or backs from carrying heavy, concentrated loads, typically on one shoulder without alternating. A right-handed scaffolder would carry the load on the right shoulder, putting a big load on the right knee, which eventually failed for most people — the cumulative vertical strain from knees to hips to shoulders meant something in the system would inevitably fail.
The occupational health crisis among scaffolders was rooted in a simple structural reality: 95% of scaffolding work involves carrying tons of steel to or away from the job site . Unlike machinery or tools that distribute load evenly, steel beams and scaffold components are rigid, heavy objects that demand one-sided body positioning across an entire working career.
This wasn't a matter of poor technique or weak workers. Experienced scaffolders like Terry Riggs, who worked on major projects including offshore construction at Barry Beach from 1978 to 1983 , faced the same inevitable wear. The problem was systemic to the work itself—no amount of skill or care could prevent the toll of sustained asymmetrical loading on a single side of the body.
Why the right shoulder and knee failed first
For right-handed workers, the pattern was predictable. Picking up a scaffold tube or steel beam naturally fell to the dominant side, making the right shoulder the primary load bearer. This created a cascade of failure: the concentrated weight stressed the right knee, which bore the gravitational and stabilizing load unevenly , then radiating upward through the hip, spine, and shoulders.
The body's interconnected skeletal system meant that compensating for knee pain shifted strain to the lower back and hips. A worker might favour their left leg to ease right knee pressure, only to develop chronic back or hip issues. The cumulative injury pattern was almost universal among long-term scaffolders, as detailed in the full Creatures of the Industry episode .
The lack of rotation and recovery
Scaffolding work offered almost no mechanism for load alternation. Unlike jobs where workers might rotate between different tasks or switch shoulders mid-day, scaffolding demanded continuous, repetitive carrying of heavy objects in the same body position. There was no built-in recovery time for asymmetrical strain to dissipate .
This relentless, single-sided loading distinguished scaffolding from other physically demanding trades. A concrete worker or bricklayer might vary their movements and body positions throughout the day. A scaffolder, by contrast, executed the same shoulder-load motion thousands of times across decades, with minimal deviation. The interview reveals how Riggs and his peers simply accepted this as the cost of the trade —a silent occupational sacrifice that nobody talked about until bodies failed.
"If you can't get on with people, you're no good. Doesn't matter if you're a super scaffolder. We'll just get rid of you and get two other people."
Terry Riggs — Contract Scaffolder. Riggs started in the building and construction industry in 1971 as a builder's labourer in Sale, East Gippsland, before transitioning to scaffolding ten years later. He worked on major projects including Barry Beach offshore construction from 1978 to 1983, where he gained expertise in complex metal scaffold construction, and obtained both scaffolding and rigging qualifications before working across numerous commercial and suburban construction sites throughout Victoria and Western Australia.
How did custom and practice function as safety and skill transmission in pre-regulation scaffolding work?
Before written safety regulations existed, experienced scaffolders passed knowledge directly to younger workers through hands-on mentorship , making custom and practice more effective than formal rules. A skilled lead hand would watch over newcomers carefully, teaching them the trade and ensuring they understood the work before moving them into dangerous positions high in the air.
In the era before scaffolding work was heavily regulated, the construction site itself became a school. As described in Creatures of the Industry , the relationship between experienced and apprentice scaffolders was built on observation, correction, and earned trust—not compliance with written procedures.
The lead hand as safety keeper
The most critical figure in this informal system was the lead hand, whose watchfulness kept younger workers alive . This person held authority not through a title but through demonstrated competence and years of working safely on complex projects. They knew every hazard before it became dangerous.
A lead hand would train newcomers by placing them in progressively more challenging positions—never throwing an untested worker into work at height until they had proven themselves capable. This gradual exposure ensured that by the time someone was working 70 metres in the air, they had internalized the rhythms and risks of the job through months of supervised practice.
Belonging to a gang meant knowing the code
Custom and practice was also about integration into a work community with unwritten but absolute standards . A scaffolder didn't just learn techniques; they learned what it meant to be part of a gang. This sense of belonging created accountability—letting down the gang or breaking an unspoken rule carried social weight that often exceeded any formal penalty.
As discussed in the episode, the question "If you can't get on with people, you're no good" captured this reality. Technical skill alone was insufficient; trustworthiness, reliability, and willingness to look out for your workmates were equally valuable. The gang would remove someone who didn't fit, regardless of their scaffolding ability, because working at height with unreliable people was fatal.
"If you can't get on with people, you're no good. Doesn't matter if you're a super scaffolder. We'll just get rid of you and get two other people."
Terry Riggs — Contract Scaffolder. Riggs began his construction career in 1971 as a builder's labourer in Sale, East Gippsland, and transitioned to scaffolding a decade later. He worked on major offshore projects at Barry Beach from 1978 to 1983, obtaining both scaffolding and rigging qualifications. Throughout his career, Riggs has worked across numerous commercial and suburban construction sites in Victoria and Western Australia, giving him deep insight into how safety culture has changed over decades.
The strength of this system lay in its immediacy. If someone made a mistake, the lead hand saw it in real time and corrected it on the spot—not in a formal incident report weeks later. Mistakes that could kill you were addressed within seconds.
To explore how scaffolder training evolved formally and what changed when regulations finally took shape, listen to the discussion of 1970s training pathways in the same series.
What was the training pathway for scaffolders in Australia during the 1970s and 1980s?
In the 1970s, scaffolders obtained a permit valid for 12 months to 2 years , during which they documented their on-the-job experience before attending formal instruction at a technical college. The real education came from learning alongside experienced scaffolders who taught the custom and practice of the trade—knowledge more powerful than any written regulation when few rules existed.
The pathway combined practical apprenticeship with institutional learning. After working on site for the duration of their permit period, apprentice scaffolders enrolled in classes at technical institutes like Swinburne. As Terry Riggs describes in the episode , the instructors themselves were former practitioners—his own instructor at Swinburne, Mr Roberts, was the chief scaffold inspector, bringing real-world authority to the classroom.
The dominance of on-the-job training over written rules
What made this training system distinctive was the primacy of experience over documentation. When Riggs transitioned to scaffolding in the early 1980s after ten years as a labourer, custom and practice—the unwritten knowledge held by veteran scaffolders—held more weight than any formal regulation . The building and construction industry had few written safety codes; the trade was governed by established methods passed directly from master to apprentice.
Riggs himself endured the full rigour of this dual commitment: after an 11-hour workday on site, he would ride his motorcycle for over an hour to attend evening or after-hours classes at the technical institute. This grueling schedule reflected how seriously both employer and worker treated formal qualification, yet it remained secondary to the daily mentoring that occurred on the scaffolding itself. The full episode explores how these informal apprenticeships shaped an entire generation of Australian construction professionals.
"If you can't get on with people, you're no good. Doesn't matter if you're a super scaffolder. We'll just get rid of you and get two other people."
Terry Riggs — Contract Scaffolder. Riggs started in the building and construction industry in 1971 as a builder's labourer in Sale, East Gippsland, before transitioning to scaffolding ten years later. He worked on major offshore projects including Barry Beach from 1978 to 1983, where he gained expertise in complex metal scaffold construction, and has spent decades as a contract scaffolder across Victoria and Western Australia.
A detail worth exploring further: Riggs's experience on the Barry Beach offshore construction project between 1978 and 1983 involved building approximately five complete jackets with zero fatalities—a safety record that reveals how the informal apprenticeship model translated into practice on some of Australia's most dangerous worksites.
Scaffolding permits in the 1970s were valid for 12 to 24 months and required workers to document their on-the-job learning before formal qualification.
Technical institutes like Swinburne provided classroom instruction after apprentices had accumulated site experience, often taught by former inspectors and practitioners.
Custom and practice—mentoring by experienced scaffolders—was more authoritative than written regulations in an era when few safety codes existed for the trade.
The dual pathway combined grueling on-site work with evening or after-hours technical college attendance, reflecting the commitment required to enter the profession.
Episode 8.2: Terry Riggs (Pt. 2)
What generational shift in worker solidarity and workplace culture has emerged in Melbourne's construction sector over the past 20 years?
Union membership has shifted from a foundation of shared values and workplace comradeship to a purely transactional relationship driven by money and hourly rates . On major projects like the Metro Tunnel, workers no longer experience the meaningful interaction with colleagues that once defined construction culture. As Riggs observes, "the brothers have just had it too good for too long and they've lost perspective"—union solidarity no longer binds workers through adversity, but rather fragments them into individual wage-seekers.
From comradeship to cash transactions
The transformation reflects a fundamental rupture in how construction workers relate to their labour and to each other. Where earlier generations understood union membership as a collective commitment rooted in shared struggle and mutual protection , current workers treat it as a contractual arrangement focused on extracting maximum hourly compensation.
This shift extends beyond attitude to material working conditions. As Terry Riggs explains in the podcast , the majority of a construction worker's wage is not the hourly rate itself but the overtime and conditions stacked on top—a reality that has reshaped how workers calculate value and view their union membership.
Loss of adversity as social glue
Earlier periods of construction work were marked by hazardous conditions that forged genuine workplace bonds. Meaningful interaction with workmates through shared hardship created the foundation of construction culture . These bonds were not sentimental—they were survival mechanisms born from industry-wide dangers, from the scaffolding heights to the refinery heat.
The contemporary construction worker, particularly on high-profile projects like the Metro Tunnel, no longer experiences this crucible. Without that shared adversity, the social fabric that once held workers together has unravelled. The result is what Riggs terms the absence of "solidarity and no comradeship"—a workplace stripped of the collective identity that once transcended individual wages.
"The brothers have just had it too good for too long and they've lost perspective."
Terry Riggs — Scaffolder and Health and Safety Representative, Metro Tunnel. With decades of experience spanning major heavy industry projects from Shell refinery upgrades to the Northwest Shelf industrial complexes, Riggs has witnessed construction culture across multiple generations. He trained as an occupational health and safety representative under the Occupational Health and Safety Act introduced by the Cain government in 1985, and holds an associate diploma in occupational health and safety from Holmesglen TAFE.
For a deeper exploration of how economic pressure and industrial restructuring have affected worker practices across different construction contexts, listen to Riggs' discussion of casualization and wage fragmentation on the Port Hedland project in the late 1990s , where workers were paid at half a dozen different rates despite doing identical work.
What structural safety management failures have been observed at major oil and gas companies claiming world-class safety practices?
Major oil and gas companies like Woodside and Esso maintain extensive documentation claiming "world's best safety practice" that remains unused and unopened in filing folders. When incidents occur, these companies conduct investigations that target the least powerful workers as scapegoats while the safety documentation never leaves the shelf—a systemic failure to implement the safety systems they publicly promote.
This contradiction sits at the heart of corporate safety culture in heavy industry. According to Terry Riggs, a scaffolder and health and safety representative with decades of experience across major Australian industrial projects, the gap between documented safety protocols and actual workplace practice creates a dangerous two-tier accountability system.
Documentation as a liability shield, not a safety tool
The real purpose of these safety folders, as described in the episode , appears to be legal protection rather than worker protection. Companies can point to their comprehensive safety documentation in court or regulatory proceedings, even as workers on the ground operate without access to or awareness of these protocols.
When incidents trigger "root and branch investigations," the focus shifts away from systemic failures in safety management and toward individual workers—typically those with the least power to defend themselves. Riggs witnessed junior workers subjected to intensive scrutiny, questioned for weeks, and ultimately dismissed, while the safety systems themselves escaped examination.
The irony is stark: the same documentation that companies tout as evidence of their commitment to "world-class safety" becomes invisible the moment a worker is injured or killed. It sits on shelves, as Riggs puts it bluntly, and "never come off the fucking shelf." This reveals a structural failure where safety management is decoupled from actual safety practice—a gap that transfers risk from the company's systems to the individual worker.
"The majority of a construction worker's wage isn't his hourly rate. It's his overtime and other conditions. That's what I missed."
Terry Riggs — Scaffolder and Health and Safety Representative, Metro Tunnel. With an associate diploma in occupational health and safety from Holmesglen TAFE and decades of experience as both a rigger and safety representative across major Australian industrial projects including Shell refinery upgrades and Transfield operations, Riggs brings firsthand knowledge of how safety systems function—and fail—in practice.
For more on how workplace injuries reshape a construction worker's financial reality, listen to the full episode where Riggs details the hidden costs of extended work-related injuries and the limitations of compensation systems.
Safety documentation at major companies serves as legal cover rather than operational guidance for workers.
Incident investigations typically blame individual workers rather than examining failed safety systems.
The gap between documented "best practice" and actual workplace implementation creates systemic risk.
Junior workers absorb accountability for failures in safety management structures.
How did the Longford Gas Plant disaster in 1998 create employment opportunities and change working conditions for construction workers in Gippsland?
After the explosion that killed five people, the remediation and reconstruction of the Longford Gas Plant became one of the most substantial construction jobs available to workers in the region . The state government invested heavily in the project, providing workers with improved conditions: 12-hour shifts, on-site accommodation at 90 Mile Beach, a dedicated canteen, and shuttle bus access across the massive facility.
Remediation work as rare opportunity
Terry Riggs secured work with Fleur Daniel on the remediation and construction phases that followed the 1998 disaster. He describes this as one of only half a dozen truly good jobs throughout his entire career in construction. The scale of the project was significant enough to absorb substantial numbers of skilled workers across multiple trades.
Though the state government's flooding of resources created the opportunity, it also came with trade-offs. Workers faced long 12-hour shifts punctuated by periods of little work , a pattern typical of large-scale industrial remediation where mobilization and demobilization cycles left gaps in productivity.
Infrastructure for the workforce
What distinguished this job from many others was the employer's provision of comprehensive support systems. Workers received accommodation directly on the 90 Mile Beach site , removing the burden of finding housing in the surrounding area. A canteen operated on-site, and a dedicated shuttle bus system transported workers across the sprawling facility.
As Riggs explains in Creatures of the Industry , the broader contrast between this project and others he worked on—particularly the casualized, de-unionized conditions on other major industrial projects—illustrates how state investment could temporarily reshape working standards. The Longford remediation represented a relatively protected employment environment, even if the work itself remained physically demanding.
"The majority of a construction worker's wage isn't his hourly rate. It's his overtime and other conditions. That's what I missed."
Terry Riggs — Scaffolder and Health and Safety Representative. With decades of experience in heavy industry across Victoria and Western Australia, Riggs worked as a health and safety representative under the Occupational Health and Safety Act introduced in 1985 and trained through an associate diploma at Holmesglen TAFE. He has worked on major projects including Shell refinery upgrades and Transfield shutdowns, and currently works at the Metro Tunnel in Melbourne.
Though the Longford project offered better infrastructure than many sites, the underlying economic reality for construction workers remained precarious. For a deeper exploration of how casualization and de-unionization shaped worker conditions on other major industrial projects in the same era, listen to Riggs discuss the Port Hedland industrial project , which operated under radically different labour practices.
What were the working conditions and labour practices on a 2,000-person industrial project in Port Hedland during the late 1990s?
The Port Hedland project in the late 1990s had virtually no union representation or organizational structure —no shop committees, no delegate committees, and almost no worker voice despite employing 2,000 people. Workers faced a casualized, de-unionized environment with half a dozen different pay rates , with some receiving cash bonuses collected before leave periods, while scaffolders were among the few who maintained any autonomy within their crews.
A fragmented workforce with no collective voice
On a site of that scale, the absence of formal worker organization was striking. Riggs describes the Port Hedland project as heavily casualized, meaning workers were hired on temporary, short-term contracts with minimal job security. There was no union solidarity whatsoever , even as workers came from all backgrounds—Italian, Greek, Spanish, Irish, English, and Fijian origins all represented on the same job.
The pay structure itself reinforced fragmentation. With workers receiving multiple rates across the workforce , there was no unified wage baseline. Some workers collected cash payments per hour directly before their roster leave—what Riggs describes as informal bonus arrangements rather than transparent contractual conditions. This system made it nearly impossible for workers to organize collectively around pay and conditions, as no two workers necessarily shared the same deal.
As discussed in detail in this episode of Creatures of the Industry , the roster itself created additional isolation: workers operated on a seven-weeks-on, one-week-off cycle, rotating through remote Western Australia's Northwest Shelf region. This pattern limited face-to-face organizing time and reinforced geographic distance from union support networks.
Scaffolders: the only exception to powerlessness
While most trades had no meaningful representation, scaffolders maintained some operational autonomy within their crews —a small but significant difference. This wasn't formal union power; it was practical craft control. Scaffolders could exercise judgment about how work was done within their gangs, though even this was constrained by the broader casualized structure of the site.
Riggs, working as a rigger with decades of health and safety experience, found himself operating without institutional backing. The 1985 Occupational Health and Safety Act had equipped workers like him with legal rights to raise safety issues, yet the Port Hedland site's lack of delegate structures meant individual safety representatives worked largely in isolation , unable to mobilize collective enforcement.
"The majority of a construction worker's wage isn't his hourly rate. It's his overtime and other conditions. That's what I missed."
Terry Riggs — Scaffolder and Health and Safety Representative, with over three decades of experience in heavy industry across Victoria and Western Australia. Riggs trained in occupational health and safety through an associate diploma at Holmesglen TAFE and worked on major projects including Shell refinery upgrades and Transfield operations before his current role at the Metro Tunnel in Melbourne. His career spans from the 1980s to the present, with significant time in the Northwest Shelf industrial region.
To understand how this casualization of 2,000 workers differed from unionized sites, Riggs also discusses the contrast with earlier Shell Refinery work in the early 1990s, where IR representatives and formal structures existed—a world completely absent at Port Hedland.
How did WorkCover compensation address the lost income and social isolation experienced by construction workers during extended work-related injuries?
WorkCover paid enough to live on, but it couldn't replace the majority of a construction worker's wage—which comes from overtime and other conditions rather than the base hourly rate. Social isolation during years of recovery added a crushing psychological cost that no compensation formula could address.
The Gap Between Base Pay and Real Earnings
The majority of a construction worker's wage isn't his hourly rate —it's his overtime and other conditions. As explained in this episode of Creatures of the Industry , Terry Riggs sustained a scaphoid fracture that kept him out of work for two years. While the compensation covered basic living expenses, it bore no relation to the actual income he lost through missed overtime.
Construction work operates on a different financial structure than most employment. The base rate is merely the foundation; real earning power comes from extended hours, shift premiums, and project-specific allowances. WorkCover assessments, however, typically calculate benefits based on ordinary time earnings—a fundamental mismatch that leaves injured workers financially adrift.
Isolation Beyond the Paycheck
The financial shortfall was only half the story. Two years without work meant two years without the social structure that defines site life . Riggs described the psychological toll plainly: "You haven't got enough money to buy yourself whiskey and you haven't got the usual social interaction and that's a big change."
Construction sites create a peculiar form of community—tight-knit teams working through shared physical demands and workplace hazards. During injury recovery, workers lose both the financial security of that work and the daily human contact that sustains it. WorkCover compensation addressed the first need inadequately, and the second need not at all. This period of isolation, detailed further in the full episode , reveals how workplace injury extends far beyond the physical healing process.
"The majority of a construction worker's wage isn't his hourly rate. It's his overtime and other conditions. That's what I missed."
Terry Riggs — Scaffolder and Health and Safety Representative, Metro Tunnel. Riggs trained in occupational health and safety through an associate diploma at Holmesglen TAFE and has worked as a health and safety representative under the Occupational Health and Safety Act introduced by the Cain government in 1985. He has spent decades in heavy industry across Victoria and Western Australia, including major projects at Shell Refinery, Transfield, and Port Hedland, and currently works at Metro Tunnel in Melbourne.
A deeper look at how workplace legislation evolved reveals how safety protections improved even as compensation structures failed to evolve alongside the reality of construction earnings.
What impact did the Occupational Health and Safety Act introduced in 1985 have on workplace practices in Australian heavy industry?
The Occupational Health and Safety Act, introduced in 1985, gave workers unprecedented legal power to challenge unsafe practices. Terry Riggs, working as a health and safety representative at Shell Refinery, issued 12 pin notices on safety violations—all but one upheld by WorkSafe—forcing the company to implement major changes and make employers face real consequences for the first time.
Workers gained genuine enforcement power
Before 1985, safety violations in Australian heavy industry were largely unpoliced from the ground level. The new act equipped workers themselves with the authority to document breaches and escalate them to the regulator, fundamentally shifting the balance of power on job sites. Riggs, trained through an associate diploma in occupational health and safety at Holmesglen TAFE, became one of the first generation of safety representatives to operate under the new framework.
At the Shell Refinery during a major upgrade project involving a new cracker unit, as described in the episode , Riggs tested the act's teeth. Eleven of his twelve pin notices were upheld by WorkSafe , meaning the regulator agreed with his findings and forced Shell to correct the violations. That compliance rate was staggering in an industry where management had previously operated with minimal oversight.
A major shock to employer culture
Employers in heavy industry had never experienced this kind of scrutiny before. Riggs recalls the moment as "a big slap around the face" for companies that assumed workplace safety was their exclusive domain to manage—or ignore. The act didn't just penalise unsafe conditions; it empowered workers to name them and demand remediation in real time.
Rather than accept defeat, some employers learned a critical lesson. According to the full episode , management subsequently developed "a few paper skills which covered some of the failings of their systems"—meaning they began documenting and formalizing safety procedures to avoid future challenges. The cultural shift was real: companies moved from reactive damage control to proactive system design.
"They got a big slap around the face."
Terry Riggs — Scaffolder and Health and Safety Representative. Riggs is a rigger with decades of experience across major construction and industrial projects in Victoria and Western Australia, including the Shell refinery upgrade, Transfield shutdowns, and currently the Metro Tunnel in Melbourne. His career spans heavy industry from the 1980s to the present, with deep expertise in the practical implementation of occupational health and safety legislation from its earliest days.
The story of how one safety representative's 12 notices reshaped an entire multinational's approach to compliance is detailed further in this episode , which also explores the personal tensions and later reconciliation between Riggs and the site's industrial relations manager, Bob Matheson, who came to respect the role of safety enforcement years later.
The 1985 Occupational Health and Safety Act gave workers legal standing to identify and challenge unsafe practices, shifting power from employers alone to a worker-regulator partnership.
Riggs' 11-out-of-12 pin notices upheld at Shell Refinery proved the act had real teeth, forcing major industrial companies to implement genuine safety changes rather than cosmetic compliance.
The act forced a cultural shift in heavy industry from management opacity to documented systems, as employers learned to formalize safety procedures to withstand scrutiny.
Workers trained in occupational health and safety became key enforcement agents, turning safety representatives from advisory roles into active regulators on the ground.